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Diasporas and British politics: the construction and engagement of diasporic communities in the 
Brexit campaigns 
 
1) Introduction  
1.1) Introduction 
In the past 20 years, since the advent of Britain’s turn towards New Labour, Britain has fashioned itself 
into a self-declared multiracial society - a neoliberal state in which a multitude of cultures, ethnic 
backgrounds and nationalities can coexist with minimal racism and negative repercussions (Sian, 
2017). Much of this multiculturality finds its roots in the increasing levels of immigration to the UK 
from Britain’s former colonies. According to the most recent census, 13% of residents in England and 
Wales (equating to approximately 7.5 million people) were born outside the UK, with the three most-
common countries of birth being formerly colonialised India and Pakistan and economically 
developing Poland (British Census 2011). While these recently migrated residents certainly contribute 
to the multiracial society which the British government so highly prides itself on, Britain’s history of 
multiculturality spans much further than the last two decades; labour immigrants have been arriving 
since the start of the British empire and migrated en-masse at the end of WWII when the UK relaxed 
immigration laws to entice new foreign workers into the country and help compensate the lacking 
young labour force. The first foundation stones of Britain’s path towards a multiracial, multicultural 
society were thus laid in the 1950s-60s when citizenship was extended to those immigrants 
permanently establishing themselves in Britain, state legislation banned racial discrimination, and 
policies were implemented to help immigrants integrate (Brown, 2006:120). 
Many of these early labour immigrants chose to settle in the UK there with their direct and extended 
families, forming ethnic, cultural and racial enclaves, which later became diasporic communities. 
Although the term diaspora has historically been synonymous with the plight of fleeing Jews, it has 
recently been reworked to transcend the traditional definition of victimization and come to 
encompass a wider range of people. One of the leading contemporary diasporic scholars, Robin Cohen, 
believes that for a migrant community to be labelled a diaspora, they need to have several of the 
following characteristics: 1) have moved from their homelands to several foreign regions to escape 
trauma, search for work or colonise new regions 2) propagate an idealized collective memory and 
myth about the homeland and a loyalty to maintain or restore it to this idealized version 3) collectively 
desire to return to the homeland, whether that be a realistic or idealised notion 4) develop common 
history and the belief in shared destiny through strong ethnic group consciousness 5) believe they will 
never be truly accepted into their new host societies 6) promote a shared solidarity among co-ethnic 
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members of the group who have settled in other countries and 7) be able to live a comfortable and 
potentially enriching life in host countries (1996:515). This is only one argument among several in the 
complex debate of what constitutes a diaspora, but it is this rather flexible definition which will be 
applied from herein. In fact, when using Cohen’s definition, it becomes clear that it is not simply the 
resettlement of migrants, but rather the co-existence of thriving diasporic communities alongside 
white Brits, which has contributed to this image of a multicultural, tolerant and neoliberal Britain. 
Yet despite the pluralist political orientation of the past 20 years and the co-existence of various 
ethnic, racial and cultural communities, the post-racial multiculturality propagated as an intrinsic 
quality of 21st century Britain has recently shown itself to be a political “fantasy” – a veneer to cover 
the persisting “deep structures of racialised injustice” (Sian, 2017). Nothing highlighted this more than 
the lead-up to the EU referendum, during which socio-political issues of cultural and racial divergence 
became closely intertwined with an inherently economic-centric, political decision. When the 
referendum was held on 23rd June 2016 to determine whether Britain should leave or remain in the 
EU, it presented the opportunity to question who can and should be allowed to live in the UK and 
under what conditions (Burnett, 2017:88). The Leave side of the campaign became an ideational space 
in which right-populist, racist and ultra-nationalistic sentiments could be expressed (Bachman and 
Sidaway, 2016:47) – sentiments which had previously been quietened at a national level under the 
guise of neoliberal tolerance and multiculturality. The anti-migrant and Islamophobic racism rampant 
throughout the Western world, in part due to the War on Terror and the 2015 Syrian refugee crisis, 
intersected the context of the EU referendum and found legitimate means to influence instrumental 
political change (Burnett, 2017:88). 
This racist anti-migrant narrative makes one question the extent to which the UK’s diasporic 
communities, as the largest and most prominent source of immigrants and racial and cultural 
difference, were involved in the referendum. Or in other words, to form a more concrete research 
question, how were these diasporic communities constructed during the campaigning period of the EU 
referendum, and to what extent were they then actively engaged in the political campaigning and 
voting? This topic is still unexplored in the academic community and should not only shed light on the 
changing attitudes towards a multicultural British society which occurred around the referendum but 
should also give an indication of how members of diasporic communities engage with and are 
presented in British politics on a national and international level. In fact, Brexit provides an excellent 
political backdrop against which to explore this latter, relatively underexplored, topic, filling a scholarly 
void by using a relevant and contemporary case-study with which to explore active and passive 
diasporic involvement with national and international politics in countries of settlement.  
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In this introductory section, I will first highlight key pre-existing literature on the topic of both diasporic 
political involvement and Brexit, before then providing an overview of the methodological approach 
used throughout this thesis and a summary of the following chapters. 
1.2) Literature Review 
This thesis has drawn upon, and hopes to build upon, two pools of relevant literature. The first pool 
pertains to diasporic involvement in politics and diasporic engagement with the host country’s society. 
One of the central characteristics which distinguishes refugees and economic, fortune-seeking 
immigrants from diasporas is that diasporas becomes “collective phenomen[a]”, whereby the group 
of individuals become “animated by an urge to preserve memories and traditional practices of the 
country of origin” (Ali, 2003:472). This notion that the country of origin should be central to an 
individual’s new life in the host country becomes particularly relevant when looking at diasporic 
political engagement. As many scholars argue, political issues which affect the diasporic communities’ 
countries of origin often become important points of political activity for diasporic individuals within 
their new host country. Both Bertrand (2004) and Østergaard-Nielson (2003) for example, explore how 
Cypriots in Britain are involved with socio-political organisations, founded and based in the UK, which 
are active in creating community centres, strengthening the Peace for Cyprus movement, offering 
direct economic support for political parties in Cyprus, and discussing human rights issues effecting 
Cypriot civilians. This political ‘long-distance nationalism’, as Benedict Anderson coined it (1992), is a 
reoccurring topic among diasporic scholars, with Byford (2012:718) arguing that the Russian diaspora 
within the UK is also engaged in homeland politics through the compatriot project – a political project 
advocated by the Russian government to strengthen national solidarity between resident and non-
resident Russians. Similarly, Werbner claims that the Afghan and Iraqi wars, as well as the nuclear 
stand-off between India and Pakistan were all homeland political issues which mobilised the South 
Asian diaspora in Britain, particularly Muslims and Pakistanis, to protest on British streets and in the 
Houses of Parliament (2004:905).  
This concentration on long-distance political engagement is one of two approaches which diaspora 
scholars have typically adopted. The second approach, as adopted by Hussain (2014), Sökefeld (2016), 
Sharma (2014) and Brown (2006) focusses on how diasporic communities are engaged with regional 
or national political issues in their host countries which directly concern the diaspora. Sökefeld argues 
that the Kashmiri diaspora uses civic, regional action such as adopting Pahari (the native language of 
Kashmir) and promoting the image of Kashmir as a Pakistani occupied region for the Kashmiris to be 
recognised by the British government as non-Pakistani nationals (2016:30). Brown meanwhile, claims 
that British Muslims, the majority with SA heritage, are more likely to vote for and be involved with a 
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British political party which promotes policies protecting Islamic beliefs, such as funding Muslim 
schools and implementing fair foreign policies with Muslim countries (2006:126).  
Hussain furthers this argument, claiming that although private organisations and government funded 
projects initiated by the Indian diaspora are particularly active in promoting Indian culture (2014:191), 
the Indian diaspora is also somewhat engaged with national politics which may or may not directly 
impact them. He asserts that the increased presence of anti-immigrant candidates in recent elections 
has increased the level of national political engagement among young SA migrants (2014:200). This 
engagement, which typically manifests as voter support, occasionally extends to running for office 
either as an MP, a counsellor within local city councils, or as part of the Friends of India and British 
Indian Parliamentary Association (2014:200). Sharma supports this, statistically demonstrating the 
increasing numbers of Indian-origin political candidates in recent elections and stating that “the new 
generation among diaspora responds not just to the issues pertaining to the diaspora but they 
perceive themselves as British and make political choices as per mainstream British population rather 
than...as diaspora community” (2014:127).  
Although Hussain and Sharma’s research demonstrates the increasing awareness among academic 
scholarship of the role that diasporas play in national politics, this is still overwhelmed by the research 
focussing on political long-distance nationalism, and on the engagement of diaspora-level and 
diaspora-relevant politics. Furthermore, the few works which do concentrate on the involvement of 
diaspora members in national-level elections and campaigns tend to only look at this in relation to the 
SA diasporas, and predominantly the Indian diaspora. This is understandable for several reasons; 
firstly, as the diaspora with the longest historical presence in the UK, there is more information on the 
political involvement of the SA diasporas than any other diaspora; secondly, as the largest diaspora it 
is likely that their political engagement on all levels is much larger than that of other diasporas; and 
thirdly, many members of the various SA diasporas are second or third generation British-born with 
fewer ties to the homeland, therefore likely increasing their level of personal investment in British 
politics rather than homeland politics. 
However, by not expanding this research into how other diasporas are engaged with national politics, 
the academic scholarship on diaspora politics remains extremely limited. The political involvement of 
the Polish, Baltic, Pakistani and other Muslim diasporas remain almost entirely unresearched. This 
thesis thus aims to fill this void by exploring and comparing the engagement of multiple diasporas in 
British national-level politics and using the relevant and contemporary case-study of Brexit to do so. 
By focussing on the Brexit campaigns, this thesis will not only explore diasporas’ political engagement 
but also the construction of diasporic groups within politics and political campaigns, illuminating the 
political relationship between white ethnic British who predominantly created these political 
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campaigns, and diasporic minority groups. This should shed light on how the construction of diasporas 
impacts the political engagement of diasporic individuals. 
For this case-study to be effectively utilised and for the construction of diasporic communities in 
political campaigns to be thoroughly explored, the second pool of literature which has been drawn 
upon is Brexit-specific. Due to the recentness of Brexit events, literature discussing the factors 
contributing to the referendum result is limited. However, more scholars are attempting to identify 
the causes and consequences of the referendum as negotiations are advancing. These scholars can be 
divided into two approximate schools of thought; those focussing on concrete quantifiable causal 
factors such as the UK’s economy and the lack of Britain’s European integration, and those who 
embrace a more constructivist approach by investigating the effect that British identity, race and 
culture had on the UK’s desire to leave the EU. It is this latter school of emerging Brexit thought that 
has influenced this thesis more than the former, as these scholars address elements which contribute 
to the shaping of white British national identity and discuss how these have impacted anti-EU 
sentiment – thus introducing race, culture and ethnicity into the debate. 
Virdee is one of the most prominent scholars in this field (2017) introducing the impact of post-colonial 
imperial longing on the Brexit outcome. Virdee argues that notions of race and nation within the UK 
are inherently attached to Britain’s former empire, and these concepts were utilised within the Leave 
campaign in two different ways to help secure its victory. Firstly, the campaigns aroused feelings of 
imperial longing in the population to return Britain to its former glory. Secondly, they encouraged a 
narrative which suggested that Britain had lost its uniqueness, and everything which had once made 
the country so great, as a result of increased globalization and multiculturality. As such, Virdee 
believes the campaigns channelled the notion of “reinstating the sovereign will of British people”, 
which was so prevalent in the colonial era, whilst simultaneously politicising the concept of 
Englishness to reassert insular nationalism (2017). 
In a similar way, Bachmann and Sidaway’s article ‘Brexit Geopolitics’ (2016) argues that the 
geopolitical decline of the UK in the postcolonial era is key to understanding the factors influencing 
Brexit. He adds to this argument of Brexit postcolonialism, stating that economic and social inequality 
among the British population also contributed to the rise of British nationalism and populism. 
Tomlinson and Dorling (2016) are further advocates of this view that the downfall of the British empire 
created a longing for a return to colonial greatness, and that this impacted the support for the Leave 
campaign – particularly among the older generation who still have memories of the benefits of 
imperial greatness. They extend this argument, claiming that the migration of British empire and 
commonwealth subjects to the UK after WWII encouraged intercultural intolerance and inspired racist 
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sentiments towards immigration which, due to the UK’s geopolitical decline, remain valid and 
important in 21st century Britain.  
While this research supports and inspires this thesis’ argument that post-colonialist racial issues and 
socio-cultural inequality between ethnic groups were all factors which the Leave campaign utilised to 
guarantee their success, these arguments nevertheless remain limited in their scope. Firstly, the 
analyses carried out by the above authors lack close readings of source materials such as the campaign 
material itself, which could help illuminate causal factors. Instead, to demonstrate their arguments, 
almost all Brexit scholars have chosen to exclusively focus on the outcomes and consequences of the 
referendum by analysing statistics such as the social positioning of voting groups and the increase in 
racial violence following the referendum. This thesis aims to overcome this limitation by analysing the 
campaign material of the Brexit campaigns – using actual source materials to demonstrate how the 
construction of diasporas reflects this post-colonial sentiment and is evidence of the increased 
nationalism and anti-immigrant narrative which accompanied the Brexit campaigns and contributed 
to the outcome of the referendum. The second way in which these analyses remain limited is by only 
acknowledging the ethnically-white British perspective. By only investigating the post-colonialism and 
racism which influenced the referendum votes of the white British public, these academic scholars do 
not acknowledge the important role of diasporic voters. This thesis should overcome this limitation 
by discussing political engagement from a diasporic perspective. 
1.3) Methodology 
In order to effectively explore the research question, set out in the introduction, a methodology has 
been adopted which aims to successfully illuminate how national-level political campaigns present 
diasporic communities, and how they influence and encourage (or discourage) political engagement 
from diasporic individuals and white Brits. This thesis is therefore an observational and descriptive 
study which will follow a within-case research design, using the official materials from the 'Vote Leave' 
(VL) campaign (headed by right-wing conservatives such as Boris Johnson and Michael Gove), the 
'Leave.EU' campaign (headed by UKIP's Nigel Farage) and the 'RemainIN' campaign (spearheaded by 
former prime minister David Cameron) to carry out a discourse analysis. The primary materials which 
have been selected for analysis are the official videos published by both camps and accessed through 
the official campaign YouTube channels, and the campaign pictures published on the timelines of each 
campaign's Facebook page. The social media aspect of these sources means that they were widely 
accessible and visible to a large proportion of the British public in the run up to the referendum and 
thus had the potential to influence voters – rendering them important sources for analysis. They will 
be supplemented with additional materials from various campaign websites as well as any relevant 
statistics published by the Office for National Statistics. Although voting demographics and statistics 
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on religion and ethnicity will be used in conjunction with the discourse analysis, this thesis is not a 
pragmatic analysis of the role of diasporas in the Brexit outcome, nor is it a simple casual analysis 
aiming to show how the campaign's construction of diasporas leads to a certain level of diasporic 
political engagement. Rather, this thesis adopts a hermeneutic agenda insofar as its aim is to analyse 
the construction of diasporic communities in the campaigns themselves, and consequently interpret 
and conceptualise diasporic political engagement in response to these campaigns.  
This thesis’ main analytical body will be divided into three distinct chapters with each chapter 
focussing on a different diasporic group and comparatively analysing the primary source materials 
from both campaign camps, using a complimentary combination of discourse analysis and semiotics. 
The first chapter will predominantly focus on diasporas with Islamic religious and cultural heritage, 
looking specifically at the Pakistani, Syrian and Turkish diasporas. The second chapter will explore the 
South Asian (herein SA) diaspora, focussing particularly on the Sikh and Hindu Indian diasporas. 
Immigrants from former British India (contemporary Pakistan, Bangladesh and India) have been 
selected as the primary topic of these first two chapters as they are the largest and most prominent 
diasporic communities in the UK. A distinction has been drawn between the Muslim diasporas and the 
other SA diasporas as the Islamophobic undertones intertwined with the referendum campaigns make 
Muslim involvement with Brexit a more complex and nuanced issue, deserving of a separate chapter. 
The third chapter is dedicated to European diasporas, exploring the political involvement of Eastern 
European diasporas, particularly the Polish and Baltic diasporas. 
By focussing on such a wide geographical and cultural range of diasporas, this thesis aims to illuminate 
the polylithic nature of these very communities, both in terms of how they are presented in British 
media and political campaigns and how actively engaged they are in the politics of their new host 
country. This will contribute to a variety of recent academic literature which has attempted to 
deconstruct the monolithic image of diasporas as one and the same of a large umbrella group. 
However, this all-encompassing and inclusive approach to diaspora research is not without its issues; 
the sheer diversity of diasporic groups within the UK, as well as the various conflicting definitions of 
what constitutes a diaspora, widens the scope of potential diasporic research too far for this thesis to 
thoroughly explore in sufficient detail. To combat this, the above mentioned diasporic communities 
have been selected as they have entered mainstream British consciousness as historically established 
communities and are thus the groups which I, as a British citizen, consider to be the most widely 
recognised and substantiated diasporas. Although this selection method is admittedly not without its 
subconscious biases, efforts have been undertaken to combat this through extensive research. 
Furthermore, although best efforts have been made to explore a range of diasporas representative of 
the polylithic reality of British society, the polylithic nature of the diasporic communities themselves 
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is another problem area which is hard to combat in a research project of this scale. While this thesis 
attempts to differentiate between certain branches of diasporic communities, I will at times be forced 
to take a rather generalized view as delving into the discrepancies within the diasporas themselves 
would jeopardise the comprehension of the central argument. As such, while attempts have been 
made to combat over-generalizations, there may be times when the specificities of religious, ethnic, 
generational, temporal or geographical differences within a certain diasporic community are not 
thoroughly explored as they are not directly relevant to the overarching thesis. 
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2) The Muslim Diasporas 
2.1) Introduction to the Muslim Diasporas 
While the number of Christians is dwindling in the UK, Islam, the second largest religion, is becoming 
ever more prevalent, with 4.8% of the British population labelling themselves as Muslim in the 2011 
census, as opposed to only 3% a decade previously. This equates to an estimated 2.7 million Muslims 
throughout the UK, with a high proportion of them settling in London, the West Midlands and 
Yorkshire. The heritage of these Muslim diasporas is extremely ethnically, culturally and linguistically 
diverse – more so than any of the other religious groups within the UK (Nielsen, 2000:121). Although 
most British Muslims find their roots in South Asia, there are large cultural discrepancies between the 
Kashmiri Muslims who originate from Mirpur or Kotli, and the Bangladeshi and Indian Muslims. 
Moreover, the increasing number of Turkish, Middle Eastern and Black African Muslim immigrants is 
only adding to this diversity (Hinnells, 2000:86).  
These “diversities of Islamic movements” within the Muslim diasporas (Kücükcan, 2004:245) not only 
stem from geographical, cultural and linguistic origins, but also from the wave of immigration with 
which they entered the UK, their eventual place of British settlement, and the various levels of multi-
generational, British-born members within the diasporas. The Kashmiri Muslim diaspora, for example, 
first began arriving in the UK in the early 20th century and clustered in inner city, urban areas such as 
Luton where there was an abundance of cheap property and low-skilled labour jobs available (Brown, 
2006:160). Other members of the Pakistani and Bangladeshi diasporas began arriving en-masse after 
the 1948 Nationality Act (Kibria, 2012:230), with Pakistanis concentrating in the Pennines, West 
Midlands and former Northern industrial areas such as Leeds, Bradford and Manchester, while 
Bangladeshi communities predominantly settled in inner city London (Hinnells, 2000:83).  
The location of these diasporas tends to reflect the average socio-economic status of their members; 
the prolonged history of low education levels in these former industrial areas where SA Muslim 
diasporas settled, means that they are relatively cheap areas to live in. Furthermore, living in ethnic 
enclaves means that new immigrants, who may be relatively uneducated and/or have limited English 
language skills, find themselves in an environment in which they can continue speaking their native 
tongue both socially and professionally, as they find low-skilled jobs working among members of the 
diaspora. In fact, as Brown points out, 65% of Pakistani and Bangladeshi households (the vast majority 
of which are Muslim), are classified as ‘low income’, in comparison to only 18% of white households 
(2006:132), clearly marking the averagely low socio-economic status of these diasporic communities. 
Yet one important characteristic which unites the SA Muslim diasporas but differentiates them from 
the Turkish and Middle Eastern Muslim diasporas, is the high proportion of British-born members 
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within these diasporas. Due to the long history of SA migration to the UK, almost half of British 
Pakistanis are second or third generation migrants who are born in the UK, while 36% of Bangladeshis 
are British born (Hinnells, 2000:85). This means that unlike the relatively new phenomena of labour-
seeking migrants from Turkey who predominantly settle in London (Kücükcan, 2004:248), and the 
recent influx of political refugees from Lebanon, Algeria, Tunisia, Sudan and Syria who have joined the 
estimated 400,000 Arabs living in major cities throughout England and Wales (2011 Census, Miladi, 
2006:948), many SA Muslims have been brought up in the UK. This results in better English language 
skills, higher levels of British-standard education and more familiarity with British culture than newer 
Middle Eastern diasporic communities. Consequently, there is a growing number of young SA Muslims 
who are well educated professionals working particularly in law, medicine, accountancy and business 
(Hinnells, 2000:86).  
Despite these growing numbers of acclimatised British-born Muslims, Muslim diasporas are still 
treated with suspicion by white Brits due to what is perceived as a reluctance to embrace British 
culture and their strong connection to the cultures of their religion and homelands. This has only 
heightened since the 9/11 attacks in New York, the 7/7 bombings and the various terrorist attacks 
throughout Europe which were carried out by Islamic extremists. The connection between terror and 
practicing the Islamic religion has thus “give(n) rise to the essentialist views of this faith and its 
followers as fundamentalist, pro-violence, uncompromising and anti-Western” (Kücükcan, 2004:254). 
It is within this context of Islamophobia, suspicion and culture clashes that the construction of Muslim 
diasporas within the Brexit campaigns will first be analysed in this chapter. After analysing how 
Muslims are constructed as monolithically undesirable, non-British ‘Others’ and as dangerous, 
potential terrorists, this chapter will then shift focus to look at Muslim engagement in the Brexit 
campaigns. 
2.2) The Construction of the Syrian Terrorist 
One of the most prominent slogans in the VL campaign was “take back control of our borders” - a 
notion promoted as a key benefit to leaving the EU and which gained traction due to the fear 
surrounding the risk of terrorists entering the UK. The attacks carried out in Europe over the past 
decade by terrorists travelling through the Schengen Area have led to an increase in EU border control 
and security. However, the influx of (majority Muslim) refugees into Europe during the 2015 Syrian 
refugee crisis raised the question of whether this relaxed attitude towards migration would make it 
easier for terrorists to enter the EU and UK. The VL camp utilised this fear, making it central to the 
campaign. In the official VL leaflet, a whole page is dedicated to this notion of “Let’s take back control 
of our borders”, with a list of border control issues under this heading (Image 1). The last issue on this 
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list claims that the “the EU Court also stops us from deporting dangerous terror suspects” – a blatant 
oversimplification which connects EU membership with the increasing risk of terrorism.  
Image 1: 
 
On the following page, a photo of refugees, marked as Muslim by the woman’s hijab, are shown 
illegally entering a country by slipping under a barbed wire fence (Image 2). Although this photo was 
not taken in the UK, the image forces the reader to implicitly connect these, presumably Syrian, 
Muslim refugees with the previous page’s issue of border control and increased terror threat. This link 
becomes even more explicit considering the page’s heading which claims that “We can’t take the risk 
of voting to stay”, followed by a quote from the former head of Interpol, stating that “Europe’s open-
border arrangement…is effectively an international passport-free zone for terrorists”. The leaflet thus 
combines the image of illegal Muslim refugees with emotive words about terrorist threats, lack of 
border security and risks to British society, playing on the fears already rampant within the UK that 
Islam and its followers are “aggressors towards western civilisation” (Sarwar, 2016). As Virdee argues, 
this narrative suggests that by “exiting the EU we could also restrict the entry of such “undesirables” 
and make Britain safe again” (2017:5) 
Image 2: 
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While this implication of the Syrian refugee as a potential Islamic terrorist is not an explicit 
construction of members of the Syrian diaspora within the UK, it undoubtedly suggests the potential 
for every Syrian and Muslim, who has recently entered the UK to pose a threat to the safety of British 
citizens. This sentiment of the Muslim terrorist ‘other’ is reinforced when this photo remerges later in 
the leaflet, uncropped, and showing a queue of Muslim refugees waiting on the other side of the 
barbed wire fence to cross the border (image 3). The increased number of refugees is significant here, 
as it increases the implied threat perpetrated through the image – it is not simply one family of 
refugees entering the UK, but a whole network of potential terrorists. The photo’s caption states 
“nearly 2 million people came to the UK from the EU over the last ten years. Imagine what it will be 
like in future decades when new, poorer countries join”. This once again highlights the undesirability 
of this diaspora within the UK by reinforcing the idea that EU membership is responsible for the influx 
of Muslim migrants, who bring with them poverty and the threat of terrorism. 
Image 3: 
 
A very similar discourse was propagated through one of the posters from UKIP’s sister campaign, 
Leave.EU. The poster, unveiled by Nigel Farage, shows a never-ending stream of dark skinned refugees 
with the words “Breaking point. The EU has failed us all” (image 4). Although this photo was most 
likely taken in the Middle East, it has once again been used to imply that the influx of Syrian and other 
refugees into Europe is ‘breaking’ the UK. The blurred faces of hundreds of refugees deindividualizes 
and dehumanises them, creating a homogenous mass of undesirable people, whose foreign culture, 
religion and skin colour marks them as distinctly separate from British values and culture. The 
connotations of ‘breaking’ only furthers this notion, suggesting that this mass of Muslim refugees is 
not just antithetical to British culture, but is also directly responsible for destroying it.  
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Importantly, most of the refugees in this photo are male, evoking images of dark-skinned male Muslim 
terrorists from the media coverage on recent terrorist attacks, and thus inciting a greater fear in the 
viewer than a more empathy-inducing female figure could create. Their overwhelming maleness and 
walking formation is reminiscent of an army marching into new land, suggesting that these refugees 
are metaphorically and literally invading the UK with their foreignness, desperation and poverty, while 
the refugees already living in the UK are simply waiting for reinforcements. Interestingly, unlike the 
image from the VL leaflet, there is very little which marks these refugees as Muslim, although the 
sentiment is certainly implied through their probable Syrian nationality; in this instance, their skin 
colour and foreignness are enough to mark them as a danger to British society. 
Image 4: 
 
 
2.3) The Construction of the Undesirable Turkish 
Another tactic used by VL which draws upon and incites Islamophobia and racial prejudice was the 
focus on the possibility of Turkey being admitted to the EU. The campaign video ‘Paving the road from 
Ankara’ (20/05/2016) on the VL YouTube channel, claims that “we are giving £2 billion to Macedonia, 
Serbia, Albania, Montenegro and Turkey…to join the EU”. The map of Europe shown simultaneously 
with the statement highlights all five countries, along with Syria and Iraq in red and dark orange (Image 
5). The colours of danger and warning unite these countries and imply that Turkey’s EU accession will 
connect the UK with the dangerous and predominantly Muslim Syrians and Iraqis.  
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Image 5: 
 
The dangerous nature of these nations is not only highlighted through the choice of colours, but also 
through a short clip of footage from the Turkish parliament in May 2016 which shows the parliament 
in absolute disarray while the MPs physically fight (Image 6). The suggestion here is that the 
uncivilised, animalistic, and almost barbaric nature of Turkish, and other Middle Eastern politics is 
forcing the UK to also lose control – the only way to supposedly avoid this and ‘take back’ control is 
by leaving the EU and unaffiliating themselves with these governments. 
Image 6: 
 
 
This message reoccurs in the images shared on the VL Facebook page and in another video (‘Win £50 
million with Kevin and Gary!’, 31/05/2016). The image portrays a white woman with her head in her 
hands, clearly in despair, with the message “Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey are 
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joining the EU. Seriously.” (image 7). The disbelief and sadness felt at uniting the UK with Turkey is 
evident and emits a very clear anti-Turkey and anti-Middle-Eastern sentiment.  
Image 7: 
 
 
The video, meanwhile, presents Kevin and Gary, two white British men with stereotypically working-
class names, behaviours and jobs (as seen in their work uniforms, accents and trip to the local pub) 
who are discussing whether Turkey or Albania will win a football game. Gary states that both countries 
are joining the EU but believes Turkey will win as they have a population of 76 million. Although the 
anti-Turkish sentiments are less pronounced in this video, Turkey’s undesirability as a fellow EU 
country is emphasized and the sheer numbers of Muslims who could potentially enter the UK are again 
presented as a reason to leave the EU. This narrative acquired traction and gained appeal with voters, 
especially appealing to the working class audience, because, as Virdee puts it, it “dovetailed so neatly 
with long-standing repertoires of negatively evaluated representations accompanying the on-going 
racialization of the figure of the Muslim” (2017:6).  
In a similar way to the representation of the Syrian refugees, although this construction of Turkey does 
not directly correlate to the Turkish diaspora within the UK, it nevertheless represents their culture, 
values and religion as undesirable and irreconcilable with British ways of life. Moreover, by connecting 
Turkish identity with that of Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Iraq and Syria, the campaign 
homogenises these various nationalities. The fact that Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania 
have sizeable, and sometimes majority, Orthodox Christian populations is irrelevant, as the campaign 
instead suggests that these countries are all united by the way in which their (sometimes minority) 
Muslim values stand in opposition to British values. As such, the Turkish diaspora in the UK (and indeed 
any smaller Serbian and Albanian diasporas) become tarnished with the same Islamophobic brush 
which painted the Syrians as potential Islamic terrorists disrupting British society. The image of the 
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Turkish Muslim diaspora thus also becomes intertwined with that of the Syrian Muslim diaspora and 
the middle eastern Muslim becomes a figure of mistrust, danger and undesirability. 
2.4) The Invisible South Asian Muslim 
While the image of the Turkish and Syrian Muslim and their respective diasporas are constructed as 
potential terrorists, the SA Muslim, who constitutes the largest Muslim diaspora within the UK, is 
notably underrepresented in the VL campaign materials. In fact, none of the individuals in the 
campaign videos on the VL YouTube channel have SA and/or Muslim heritage, despite SA Muslims 
representing approximately 4% of the British population (2011 Census). Similarly, of the 279 images 
shared on the timeline of the official VL Facebook campaign, only 6 of them show individuals who 
could potentially belong to the SA Muslim diaspora. Of these 6 images, 5 of them are photo collages 
of campaign volunteers, thus reducing the construction of the SA Muslim to a small photo of one or 
two individuals, among many more white individuals (image 8). 
Image 8: 
 
This lack of SA Muslim representation reveals several things. Firstly, by only choosing to negatively 
represent Muslims who live outside the UK and from nations with very small diasporic communities 
within the UK (and thus small levels of political power and minimal voting rights), the VL campaign 
minimises the risk of isolating SA British Muslims. By only portraying Syrian and Turkish Muslims as 
potential terrorists, the campaign is less likely to lose support from the SA Muslim diasporas, who 
collectively have a relatively strong voting voice. Secondly, it encourages the public to conflate the SA 
Muslim with the Middle-Eastern terrorist other, as there is no directly positive construction of the SA 
Muslim to oppose the assumption of the dangerous Muslim figure. Thirdly, by reducing the ethnic 
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diversity and number of Muslim individuals published in the campaign, VL succeeds in presenting the 
UK as having a principally white society. This rather utopian image conforms with their general anti-
Muslim sub-sentiments and the racism-inciting agenda to appeal to those voters who would choose 
to vote to leave the EU to reduce immigration and maintain an ethnically white Britain. 
However, this lack of Muslim representation is a tendency also seen in the Remain campaign. Of the 
66 videos in the ‘Britain Stronger in Europe’ campaign videos on the Open Britain (OB) YouTube 
channel, only one of them presents a vocal, everyday (non-politician) member of the Muslim diaspora; 
17-year-old Shralifa explains why she believes Britain should stay in the EU in the ‘Vote Remain for 
their Future’ video (21/06/2016). Her ten second segment, in which she talks about the importance 
of staying united in the face of those who “wish to divide us”, is the only time the opinion of an 
average, openly Muslim individual is shown (image 9). Crucially, she is under the voting age of 18 and 
her message, although clear and concise, is mitigated and undermined by her youth, inexperience and 
lack of political power. The video construction of the SA Muslim diaspora thus becomes overwhelmed 
by the voices of white Brits and is presented as marginal and unimportant. 
Image 9: 
 
The OB Facebook page also has limited SA Muslim diasporic representation with only 16 images 
showing individuals of presumable SA Muslim heritage, equating to only 7% of the 227 images. In a 
similar way to the VL campaign, most of these images are collages containing photos of campaigners 
throughout the country, meaning that the Muslim individual is often represented as a token ethnic 
minority among a sea of white Brits. However, the OB campaign includes definitively more Muslim 
individuals in these collages than the opposition campaign. Moreover, 2 of these 16 photos exclusively 
show members of the SA Muslim diasporas. The first presents a young Muslim woman with two males, 
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all of whom are holding “I’m in” posters and smiling (image 10). The background of the photo is 
unmistakably British with red brick houses, lampposts and umbrellas to protect them from the grey 
English weather – situationally contextualising these individuals as Brits. Yet despite this undoubtedly 
Britishness of these young individuals, one of the comments on the photo questions “are these 
students actually British?”, reflecting the Islamophobic undercurrent of opposition which the Leave 
campaign attempted to harness. 
Image 10: 
 
The second all-Muslim picture shows the same three diasporic individuals holding the posters in what 
appears to be their corner shop (image 11). This common trope of the local corner shop being run by 
a SA Muslim family is a picture which many British people would recognise from their own towns and 
which marks these Muslim individuals as integrated cornerstones of the local community. By selecting 
an image which constructs Muslims from average socio-economic backgrounds in an overtly 
stereotypical environment, the Remain campaign normalises the Muslim figure. However, it also 
simultaneously reinforces potentially harmful and prejudiced stereotypes about the position of 
Muslims in British society. This has a two-fold effect, insofar as the averageness of these individuals 
constructs a sympathetic image which is more likely to appeal to a wider audience of both fellow 
Muslim voters who recognise similarities between themselves and these individuals, and to white 
British voters who recognise these people as symbolic members of their local communities. 
Conversely by conforming to the socio-economic stereotype, rather than portraying Muslims as 
lawyers, businessmen or creative entrepreneurs, the campaign reinforces the idea that members of 
the SA Muslim diasporas generally “have little education and lack sophisticated intellectual tools” 
(Brown, 2006:109). This view is reflected in one of the photo comments which states “I’m in…The U.K. 
And now claiming benefits” – a comment founded on the widespread, yet misconceived notion that 
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Muslim migrants are uneducated and lazy so come to the UK to claim state aid and avoid having to 
work. 
Image 11: 
 
 
2.5) South Asian Muslim Political Engagement 
Although only one of the OB YouTube videos portrays an everyday Muslim, there are two videos which 
present a practicing, SA Muslim politician – Sadiq Khan, Labour Party MP and Mayor of London. Both 
videos (‘Sadiq Khan & David Cameron on Brexit’, 30/05/2016 and ‘Get the Facts about Europe’, 
16/06/2016) show clips of Khan giving motivational speeches and presenting facts to Remain 
campaigners. The fact that such a prominent and popular Muslim political figure was so openly 
campaigning to remain in the EU would not have gone unnoticed among other Muslim voters. In fact, 
by being so openly involved in the campaign, Khan demonstrates that the EU referendum is a topic 
which effects the SA Muslim diaspora. He reinforces this in his speech to the ethnically diverse group 
of campaigners by emphasizing that it is diseases such as Parkinson’s and breast cancer, and problems 
such as unemployment and lack of opportunities that can be tackled if the UK remains in the EU 
(30/05/2016). By focussing on issues which effect every single British citizen, regardless of ethnicity 
or cultural heritage, Khan highlights the universal necessity of becoming politically engaged with the 
referendum and places the importance of the Muslim diaspora vote on par with that of ethnically 
white Brits. His involvement also promotes ethnic diversity and tolerance – both qualities which the 
UK and the EU promote as key foundation cornerstones of a neoliberal Western society. 
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Another way in which these qualities are promoted is through volunteer photos shared on Facebook. 
Unlike the VL campaign, the collage images of campaign volunteers on the official OB Facebook page, 
consistently show individuals from a range of diverse ethnic backgrounds and skin colours. Although 
it is somewhat difficult to determine the religion of every volunteer, an average viewer would be able 
to recognise the SA heritage of some volunteers and consequently assume that this campaign is 
supported by several Muslims. While this tactic is extremely strategic in garnering new support by 
implying the wide-spread support of the campaign among many different nationalities, it also 
indicates how some members of the SA Muslim diaspora were actively engaged in promoting the 
Remain campaign.  
However, these collages were compiled with a specific campaign goal; namely to combat the racist 
undertones of VL and appeal to the masses. As such, the extent to which these images reflect true 
levels of Muslim diasporic involvement is unclear. The same can be said of the lack of SA Muslim 
volunteers in the VL volunteer photos. On the one hand, a lack of photographic evidence could suggest 
the lack of SA Muslim political engagement in the campaign. Yet, on the other hand, it cannot be 
assumed that the lack of Muslim volunteers is an accurate reflection of Muslim political engagement, 
as the campaign organisers could have compiled and selected certain images to promote a 
predominantly ethnically white view of the UK, and appeal to white British voters.  
To analyse Muslim diasporic engagement in the campaigns, it is therefore useful to examine any 
political involvement and campaigning initiated by the SA Muslim diasporas themselves, rather than 
constructed by white British campaigners. The Muslim Association of Britain, a political group 
promoting Muslim participation in Britain, released a press statement just weeks before the 
referendum claiming that it “backs vote to remain in EU” (07/06/2016). The statement begins by 
emphasizing the benefits that EU membership brings to the UK – environmental, legal and personal 
security, as well as job benefits, employment opportunities and the EU market. In doing so, it clearly 
acknowledges the Muslim diaspora as British citizens who benefit from the same advantages as white 
Brits. The statement then claims that there is a the “disturbing rise of xenophobia and Islamophobia 
in our society” and that an “exit from the EU runs the risk of perpetuating rifts in British society, which 
would increase levels of hate crimes against British Muslims”. This shift towards Muslim-specific issues 
not only suggests that the Muslim diaspora should have their own, exclusive reasons for political 
engagement, but should also combine these reasons with their responsibilities as British citizens. It is 
also a subtle dismissal of the Leave campaign’s perpetuation of these rifts between white Brits and 
Muslims through their negative Muslim representation.  
While support for Remain may seem logical for the Muslim diasporas considering the xenophobia in 
VL, this was not necessarily the case. On the ‘outreach’ page of the VL website, a link for the ‘Muslims 
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for Britain’ webpage is listed – a page purposefully established to support the VL campaign. Unlike the 
statement from the Muslim Association of Britain, Muslims for Britain’s statement begins by listing 
reasons to leave the EU which directly relate to the Muslim diaspora. The statement claims that “by 
leaving the European Union, Britain would be free to make its own free trade deals with 
commonwealth countries such as Pakistan, Bangladesh and India”. Interestingly, only Muslims of SA 
heritage are targeted here, who, unlike the Turkish and Syrian Muslims, were not presented quite so 
negatively in the Leave campaign. The ‘Bangladesh for Britain’ website, which was also linked to the 
VL outreach page, uses a similar diasporic-specific rhetoric. Their statement claims that “many 
Bangladeshi immigrants find it difficult to obtain a visa and many are sent home after a period of time 
because of changes to skilled workers visas” and that “Commonwealth and all non-EU immigrants are 
discriminated against in favour of EU immigrants”. By selecting issues directly impacting the relevant 
diasporas, both pages are attempting to encourage engagement with British politics with an Islamic 
focus, promoting policies which will have the best possible outcome for SA Muslims rather than for 
the British population. This philosophy only strengthens the divides between Muslim diasporas and 
white Brits by emphasizing the different needs of the two groups and promoting a lack of unity.  
Although these websites demonstrate that the SA Muslim diaspora was actively engaged in political 
campaigning to some extent, what they do not illuminate is the impact that this engagement had on 
the average, everyday Muslim voter. The Muslim Association of Britain for example, despite having 
over 7000 ‘likes’ on their Facebook page, may have remained relatively unknown and uninfluential in 
swaying the political votes of the Muslim diaspora. Similarly, although the ‘Muslims for Britain’ 
Facebook page has 162 ‘likes’, it does not mean that their political sentiments were not shared by a 
greater majority. However, a post-referendum Lord Ashcroft Poll, while unable to demonstrate the 
exact involvement of British Muslims in voting in the referendum, or to gauge the political engagement 
in the campaigns, nevertheless provides an indication of the general voting tendencies among the 
Muslim diasporas in the UK. Of the 201 Muslims surveyed in the poll, 70% of them voted to remain in 
the EU, with 30% voting to leave.  
Although the poll is slightly unrepresentative as only 12369 people were surveyed, and of those people 
only 2% identified as Muslim (under half of the figure indicated by the 2011 national census which 
indicated that 4.8% of the population identify as Muslim), it nevertheless leads to two rather tentative 
conclusions; firstly, the Islamophobic undertones of the Leave campaign may have persuaded the 
Muslim diaspora to vote to remain in the EU, and secondly, the discrepancies between the percentage 
of Muslim voters in the poll and the percentage of Muslims in the UK suggest that many Muslims may 
not have voted in the referendum and were not actively engaged in this element of British politics.   
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2.6) Concluding remarks  
Despite the distinctions between the Muslim diasporas in the UK, the construction of these groups in 
the VL campaign materials tends to be rather monolithic insofar as the Syrian, Turkish and other 
Middle-Eastern Muslims are all presented as potentially dangerous terrorists, who threaten the 
wealth, security and culture of British society. The lack of voting rights held by recent Syrian and 
Turkish immigrants to the UK, means that this negative representation of these diasporas did not have 
far-reaching consequences on the overall outcome of the referendum, as the very people who were 
so negatively portrayed in the campaigns often could not vote. Meanwhile, the SA British Muslim is 
notably underrepresented in the Leave campaign, thus marginalising the SA Muslim voice and 
potentially isolating the Muslim voter, while simultaneously encouraging the conflation of the SA 
Muslim with the Middle-Eastern Muslim. The non-recognition of Muslim influence in British society 
by VL presents the UK as a predominantly white, binarised society in which the white Brit symbolizes 
true British values, and the Middle-Eastern Muslim acts as the antithesis and threat to this. This 
underrepresentation of Muslim diasporas in the Leave campaign also occurs in the Remain campaign, 
but further extends to include Middle Eastern Muslims too, echoing the necessity to appeal to white 
voters. However, when SA Muslims are constructed in the Remain campaign, they tend to be 
portrayed as well integrated, if somewhat stereotypical, members of the community with low socio-
economic statuses and power.  
These two differing approaches to Muslim representation is reflected in the engagement of the 
Muslim diaspora in the campaigns and referendum. Although not a direct causal link, VL’s rather 
negative and monolithic stance on Muslims as foreign and dangerous ‘others’ undoubtedly had some 
impact on Muslim support, and this is evidenced in the lack of Muslim campaigns and Muslim votes 
to leave the EU. Conversely, the approach of the Remain campaign to present members of the Muslim 
diasporas as integrated British citizens, and not emphasize their differences, resulted in more support 
for this campaign from these communities. As such, it would not be illogical to conclude that the 
engagement of the Muslim diaspora in national politics appears to be somewhat influenced by their 
representations in the political campaigns and the extent to which these campaigns construct them 
as valid members of British society who have important political voices and power.  
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3) South Asian Diasporas 
3.1) Introduction to the South Asian Diasporas 
Geopolitically, SA refers to the nations of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Tibet and Sri 
Lanka (Desai, 2004:4) with most of the SA population in Britain falling into four approximate 
categories; the Bangladeshis, Pakistani Punjabis, Sikh Punjabis and the Gujaratis (Sharma, 2014:119) 
and 45% of Indians identifying as Hindus, and 27% as Sikhs (Sharma, 2014:122). The history of the 
Punjabi and Gujarati diasporas within the UK begins much the same way as the Muslim SA diasporas, 
insofar as Indians began migrating to the UK in the mid-1800s (Hinnels, 2000:78), with the majority 
arriving from India in the 1950s-60s following the post-WWII labour shortage (Hinnels, 2000:79).  
Gendered migration also followed a similar pattern to that of the SA Muslims with the predominantly 
young, uneducated and poor males from rural backgrounds arriving first, then followed by their wives 
and families once the males could provide financial support (Brown, 2006:44, Hinnels, 2000:86). 
However, the migration pattern of Hindu and Sikh SAs differed from that of Muslim SAs. Many of the 
migrants arriving in the 1950s were so-called ‘twice migrants’ who were former indentured labourers 
arriving from Africa and the Caribbean (Cohen, 2008:61). Although many of these migrants originally 
came from poor, rural backgrounds and worked in agriculture in their indentured homelands, it was 
common for them to have transitioned into government employment, the civil service, trade or 
private services after completing their indentured labour contracts (Brown, 2006:38).  
The majority of these ‘twice migrants’ thus arrived with a strong skill-set, including professional 
experience and strong English language capabilities. They were already familiar with migration 
processes, having previously undergone cultural adaptation processes and were therefore “well aware 
of the benefits to be gained from developing alternative institutional arrangements of their own” 
(Ballard, 2000:134). The children of these East African Indian migrants were familiar with British-
governed education systems and had been brought up in a culture committed to personal and 
educational advancement (Ballard, 2000:134). Moreover, Sikh and Hindu women joined their 
husbands much earlier than Muslim wives did (Hinnels, 2000:80). Community development within the 
diaspora thus occurred much faster as the newly-arrived women began running temples, organised 
worship groups and maintained familial and kinship networks (Hinnels, 2000:98).  
A combination of these two factors meant that many SA Hindus and Sikhs arrived in the UK with an 
improved socio-economic position, more financial support, and relevant skills to begin life in a new 
country. This enabled them to adapt and settle much faster than their Muslim counterparts, whose 
families tended to arrive much later, with fewer transferable skills and less experience of resettlement. 
Subsequently, Indians have generally “prospered the most” out of all the diasporic communities 
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(Brown, 2006:69), regardless of whether they were direct or twice migrants. East-African-Asians and 
Indians, for example, have the highest proportion of children entering professional careers as lawyers, 
doctors or accountants (Hinnels, 2000:86). In fact, 30% of young British Hindus hold a university 
degree, and 5% of Hindus overall are doctors (Jaffrelot, 2007:287). Sikhs have enjoyed similar levels 
of improved socio-economic mobility, with virtually all Sikh families being categorised as “broadly 
middle class”, having moved out of small, run-down inner-city houses and now living in suburban 
properties (Ballard, 2000:135). 
With a marked increase in socio-economic status and higher levels of social integration into 
mainstream British culture than their SA Muslim counterparts (Sharma, 2014:128), it only follows that 
the SA Hindu and Sikh diasporas are also more involved in British politics. This is evidenced, by the 50 
ethnically Indian candidates who competed in the 2015 general elections, as well as the 12, non-
Muslim Indian MPs who were voted in in 2017 (Sharma, 2014:127). However, to what extent were 
prominent SA politicians engaged in the Brexit campaigns, and how were they, and other members of 
the Indian diaspora constructed in the campaigns themselves? 
3.2) The Construction of the Integrated Indian 
The constructions of members of the SA diaspora in the campaign videos on the OB YouTube channel 
are completely unremarkable and distinctly average – with Indians almost exclusively portrayed as 
everyday members of the British work force. In ‘Jobs and the EU Referendum (02/04/2016), for 
example, an Indian-heritage young woman is shown in professional attire, intensely discussing what 
is presumed to be work-place concerns in an office setting (Image 12). Her status as a working woman 
reflects the increasing norm among British Hindus and Sikhs for females to leave the realm of the 
domestic to earn money and begin careers, echoing Brown’s claim that “Hindus and Sikhs are much 
more accepting of women working in a range of paid employment” than their Muslim SA counterparts 
(2006:71). Similarly, in ‘Get the Facts about Europe’ (14/01/2016), another young SA Brit is shown 
working in a call centre. These two representations of young SA professionals suggest that SA diasporic 
members are thoroughly integrated into British society and the work place, working white-collar 
professions alongside white ethnic Brits.  
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Image 12: 
 
In support of this sentiment, a SA man is pictured at work in another video entitled ‘Get the Facts 
about Europe’ (03/03/2016), wearing a high-vis jacket and signalling to a co-worker. Although his 
outfit and surroundings label him a blue-collar worker, he is shown physically contributing to the 
British economy and labour market. The well-integrated nature of the SA diaspora is also presented 
on a personal level too. In ‘Brexit and the EU: the 6 Key Facts you need to know’ (24/05/2016) an Asian 
student is pictured laughing and joking in an ethnically diverse group of fellow student friends. His 
religious and ethnic heritage are of no importance as the scene makes it clear that he is a well-liked 
and accepted member of the predominantly white group (Image 13).  
Image 13: 
 
Throughout the campaign materials, members of the SA diasporas are repeatedly, and almost 
exclusively, constructed as minorities working and living among white Brits. Their diasporic, communal 
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nature is only hinted at once in the campaign videos during a scene in which a SA doctor is shown 
treating a young Indian boy who is accompanied by his father (‘What does the EU referendum mean 
for Sam’s future?’, 24/05/2016). This is the only instance in which multiple people of Indian heritage 
are shown in the same clip, referring to the areas in the UK in which the SA population is substantive 
enough that a professional member of the Indian diasporic community could encounter fellow 
community members while at work (Image 14).  
Image 14: 
 
Aside from playing up to the stereotype of the Indian doctor, the professional aspect of this scene is 
important insofar as this cluster of SAs is presented as occurring only in a professional, public setting 
rather than on a personal, private level. By confining this inter-diasporic interaction to the professional 
realm, OB refrains from presenting the strong community aspect of the SA diasporas – instead 
emphasizing their professional and social integration. On the one hand this serves to positively 
eliminate the outsider status of the SA diasporas by presenting them as no different from average 
white Brits. Yet on the other hand, this approach ignores the cultural differences between the SA 
diasporas and white British society to such an extent that ‘multiculturality’ is reduced to homogeneity 
and the unique characteristics of these diasporic communities are undermined. 
Despite this overall positive image of the well-integrated, hard-working SA Brit who contributes to 
British society, the SA diasporas are nonetheless constructed in a slightly marginalised manner, insofar 
as not a single member of these diasporas are given a voice in these Remain videos. Unlike the 
numerous white Brits who share their views on why they want the UK to stay in the EU or who feature 
as the main ‘characters’ in campaign storylines, the British SAs remain on the side-lines of the 
campaign materials. While they are of course an ethnic minority in the UK, and are arguably 
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represented proportionally as such, their lack of voice proves demeaning; presenting them as having 
no real opinion about the upcoming referendum worthy of being published in any official capacity.  
This side-lining of the SA diasporic view also occurs in the Remain campaign material published on the 
official OB Facebook page. Of the 15 images featuring brown-skinned individuals of presumable SA 
heritage, none of them present the SA diaspora member as an individual with an opinion. Instead, 
they are all de-individualised through their depiction as one of numerous campaigners or voters 
(image 15). In fact, the only SA individual given any prominence is Indian Prime Minister, Narendra 
Modi (image 16). Although this image has been included in the campaign to directly connect with and 
appeal to the Indian diasporic voters in the UK, it also serves to highlight just how the opinion of a 
non-British SA is deemed more worthy and important than that of a UK-residing member of the SA 
diaspora.  
Image 15: 
 
Image 16: 
 
SA diasporic members are further de-individualised and marginalised through their rather 
homogeneous representation. Unlike members of the Muslim diasporas who tend to be quite overtly 
represented as Muslim and are thus easily recognised as such through their clothing and the context 
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in which they are shown, the campaign neglects to mark the Hindus and Sikhs as overtly. 
Consequently, the many differences which exist among the various SA diasporic groups are reduced 
and the SA Hindus, Sikhs and Christians, whose cultural heritage is just as diverse as their religious 
orientation, are presented as one and the same in the Remain campaign videos and images. 
3.3) Leaving out in the Leave campaign  
Although the construction of members of the SA diasporas may be somewhat homogenous and silent 
in the Remain campaign, the fact that they are presented in the campaigns at all must not be 
overlooked – particularly as there is almost no SA representation in the VL campaigns. The only images 
which feature members of the SA diaspora are the five collages on the official VL Facebook page which 
spotlight the campaigners, showing gratitude for their efforts. In each of these photos, only one 
individual of SA roots is shown, and their cultural and religious heritage remains unmarked (image 17). 
The remaining 274 images on the page refrain from any form of photographic or written 
acknowledgement that these diasporic groups constitute an important part of the UK population.  
Image 17: 
 
This non-representation continues in the YouTube videos, with only one video, ‘Which NHS will you 
vote for?’ (23/05/2016) featuring an individual with SA background. The Indian woman appears 
extremely briefly as a sick patient waiting to be seen by a doctor in A&E (Image 18). She appears for 
no more than one second in the background of a close-up shot of a white male. Interestingly, in the 
parallel video which imagines the same, much less crowded, hospital waiting room in a post-Brexit 
reality, the woman is not shown, suggesting here that there is no place for sick and elderly Indian 
women in the UK once it has left the EU. As such, the only representation of the SA diasporas in the 
video campaigns both physically and metaphorically side-lines their role in British society; not only are 
they practically non-existent within the UK, but those who do live here are presented as undesirable, 
sickly members of society who drain the NHS of its resources. 
 
30 
 
Image 18: 
 
The lack of SA representation in the Leave campaign is however equally as interesting to analyse as 
concrete representation. As argued in the previous chapter, by not featuring many SA individuals in 
the visual campaign materials, VL constructs a predominantly white utopian version of the UK. This 
construction of an all-white Britain is not only presented as a possible future should the UK leave the 
EU but is also intrinsically connected to Britain’s imperial past. When paired with images of ethnically 
white Brits, the central slogan of the VL campaign “Let’s take back control” emphasises the need to 
reinstate the sovereign will of the white British population (Virdee, 2017:3). By claiming that control 
has been lost since joining the EU regionalist initiative and becoming reliant on external laws, power 
politics, and the EU’s neoliberal values, the slogan ignites a desire to return to the period in which the 
UK’s global status and economic power was sourced internally; power achieved not through the 
multicultural approach propagated by the EU, but from an insular, nationalist approach which proves 
the UK’s strength as an independent sovereign nation.  
This notion of restoring Britain to its global position of primus inter pares incites nostalgia for the time 
of the British empire, during which white Britishness reigned supreme, both economically and 
culturally, over colonial societies (Virdee, 2017:1). This subtle narrative of imperial longing becomes 
even more marked in the campaigns when one considers that it is the SA diasporas, the direct 
descendants of colonialism, who are shunned from this image of white Britain. Thus, by not 
representing members of the SA diasporas, the VL campaign appeals to those who desire a return to 
white British greatness as “the global hegemon of the capitalist world economy” (Virdee, 2017:4), 
regardless of the racist underbelly which accompanies this cultural and racial superiority. 
This sentiment is not just propagated in the Leave campaign through the process of side-lining SAs, 
but also through some of the content of the YouTube videos. ‘Heroes’ (17/12/2015) for example, lists 
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ten historical and influential British figure, including Newton, Nelson, Pankhurst, Darwin, and 
Churchill. Of the ten figures, all but one was from Britain’s colonial era, with several of them (most 
notably Darwin and Churchill) known for their controversial racist views. By only mentioning figures 
and their achievements from a time in which the global status of the UK was at its most powerful, the 
VL campaign adds to this nostalgia and longing for the imperial decades, suggesting that notable global 
achievements only occur during time of white British superiority.  
The video furthers this sentiment by concluding that “These British heroes changed the world. Don’t 
believe those who talk Britain down, who say we’re too weak to control our own affairs”. By 
regurgitating the notion that being in control of British affairs can only occur if the UK regains its 
sovereignty and former status as colonial power, the Leave campaign subtly undermines the non-
white, SA members of British society and attempts to reinstate their colonial status as minority 
subjects – stripping them of their political and social power in modern-day Britain. 
3.4) The Engagement of South Asian Political Figures 
Although the average SA individual is not constructed in the Leave campaigns, that is not to say that 
politicians with SA heritage were not engaged with the campaign. Priti Patel, a Hindu MP and member 
of the Conservative Party with Ugandan-Gujarati heritage, was highly active; founding the ‘Women 
for Britain’ campaign for females opposed to staying in the EU, and often cited as the VL poster-girl. 
She features on the VL Facebook page (image 19) with an accompanying statement directly tailored 
and addressed to SA diasporic members.  
Image 19: 
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She begins her statement claiming that “the Indian diaspora can vote to make a real and positive 
difference to the future of the UK and India by voting to leave the EU”, and then emphasizes how 
leaving the EU will allow the UK to bolster trade links with the growing Indian economy. She next lists 
the advantages that Brexit would bring to the immigration system by allowing the “brightest and the 
best in from around the world”, adding that “because we are unable to restrict migration from the EU, 
immigrants from non-EU countries have faced more restrictions…I know that many members of the 
Indian diaspora find it deeply unfair that other EU nations effectively get special treatment”.  
By targeting this statement directly at the British-Indian diaspora, the factors which could influence 
SA voters’ behaviour are redefined; the implication that SA migration to the UK would be easier if the 
UK were to leave the EU is positioned as a factor which would influence SA voters, as they would vote 
to leave the EU to strengthen their personal and professional ties with their heritage country, rather 
than for reasons directly relating to Britain’s prosperity and political sovereignty. The ethno-cultural 
heritage of the diasporic voters is thus presented as the most important influential factor in 
determining their votes, while the present-day nationality and national interests of these voters is 
barely acknowledged. This reflects the political pattern suggested by Conversi (2012:1358), who 
believes that nationalism, and by extension, political projects effecting the nation, are often perceived 
by the diasporic communities as opportunities to defend their communities. It is this concept of 
defending the Indian diasporas’ national interests which Patel attempts to tap into to garner Indian 
diasporic votes.  
Despite the validity and appeal of Patel’s statement, by only concentrating on how leaving the EU 
could benefit the Indian diasporic community, Patel’s political engagement succeeds in widening the 
racial gulf prevalent throughout the campaign. By so clearly distinguishing SA priorities from white 
British priorities, VL isolates the SA diaspora from the concept of Britishness upon which the campaign 
so heavily relied. SA engagement with VL thus becomes estranged from the core sentiment of 
regaining British sovereignty and global power which was such a key mobilising factor among white 
British Leave voters. This only serves to reinforce the notion of racial, cultural and political difference 
between white and diasporic communities, further igniting the ever-prevalent racism and xenophobia 
intertwined in the Leave campaign which was targeted at the non-Britishness of these diasporic 
citizens. 
Conversely, the approach adopted by high-profile SA political figures in the Remain campaign is 
consistent with the construction of the everyday SA individual in the campaign material, insofar as 
there is a recurring narrative of the fully integrated SA. Although most influential political figures 
highlighted in the YouTube videos are white Brits, Labour Party politician, Baroness Shami Chakrabarti, 
who was born to Bengali parents and raised Christian, features in one of the videos. While the lack of 
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engagement from SA politicians is important in reflecting a potential lack of political engagement 
among SA diasporas, this lonesome video nonetheless contributes to the overall construction of the 
SA diasporas.  In ‘What do experts think about Brexit’ (08/06/2016), Chakrabarti stresses that the two 
World Wars occurred because of “excessive competition, rivalry and hate between nations” and that 
Europe needs “collaboration and cooperation” going forward (Image 20). Her emphasis on European 
history and the EU’s future allows Chakrabarti to position herself not as a member of an ethnic 
minority and diasporic community, but as a British citizen who has a shared history and future with 
Europe.  
Image 20: 
 
Moreover, Chakrabarti’s use of the ambiguous, collective pronoun ‘we’ aligns SAs with British and EU 
citizens. In doing so, Chakrabarti’s political engagement with the Remain campaign transcends the 
typical construction of SA diasporic individuals as well-integrated British citizens, instead implying that 
they are members of a much larger regional community.  The suggestion here is that despite the 
cultural and ethnic history and differences of the SA diasporas, they are also British and EU citizens, 
and should therefore vote in accordance with British and EU interests, rather than with purely 
diasporic interests in mind.  
3.5) Concluding remarks 
The success of these differing approaches presented by political SA individuals can be measured, to 
some extent, by the engagement of the SA diaspora in the referendum. According to the post-
referendum Lord Ashcroft Poll, 58 of the 83 Hindus poll-participants voted Remain in the EU, with half 
of the 20 Sikhs choosing to Remain. While the poll is certainly flawed with regards to its accurate 
representation and low number of participants, these figures are certainly indicative of general voting 
tendencies. In a similar pattern to Muslim voters, the Hindus’ political engagement and their voting 
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habits stand in correlation to their representation in the campaigns; namely, the more frequently and 
positively British SA Hindus were constructed in the campaign, the more likely they were to vote for 
that outcome. As the Remain campaign featured more representation of SA diasporic members (albeit 
a somewhat homogenous and marginalised representation) Hindus were more likely to be able to 
identify and sympathise with the Remain campaign.  
Conversely, the lack of SA construction, general sentiments of colonial nostalgia and the desire to 
return to wide-spread white British supremacy prevalent in the VL campaign resulted in limited 
support from this diasporic group. These figures also suggest that the Leave campaign’s attempt at 
convincing SA Hindus to vote Leave by appealing to their status as a distinct community with separate 
political diasporic interests was less successful than the Remain campaign’s approach of underlining 
their status as well-integrated British and EU citizens. This supports Sharma’s claim that the modern-
day diaspora, particularly the new generation, “perceive themselves as British and make political 
choices as per mainstream British population rather than having a narrow approach of thinking 
themselves as a diaspora community…unconnected from major national challenges and issues” 
(2014:127).  
Interestingly, however, the Sikh diaspora appears to have had a split view. Despite the press release 
issued by the Sikh Council UK and the online campaign initiated by the Sikh Federation UK to persuade 
British Sikhs to vote Remain, approximately 50% of Sikh voters appear to have voted Leave. While the 
Lord Ashcroft poll is hugely unrepresentative of the actual number and orientation of Sikh diasporic 
votes, it appears that the votes of the Sikh diaspora were not as widely influenced by a lack of, or 
negative, Sikh construction in the campaigns, or by the lack of prominent Sikh politicians involved in 
either of the campaigns. A rather speculative reason for this could be the Sikhs’ “insist[ence] on their 
distinction” and their acceptance of minority status both in their homeland of India and within the 
British SA diaspora (Cohen, 2008:65). Their lack of representation in political campaigns could 
therefore be an accepted norm within the community, due to their limited numbers. Moreover, their 
small diasporic community could also mean that their ties to India are much more prominent than 
that of the Hindu diaspora, of which many members have extended family throughout the UK and 
therefore do not need to rely on transnational connections. Consequently, VL’s attempt at directly 
appealing to the needs of the diasporic community vis-à-vis easier family migration and improved 
business connections may have influenced Sikhs more strongly.  
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4) Eastern European Diasporas  
4.1) Introduction to the Eastern European Diasporas  
En-masse Eastern European (EE) migration to the UK is much more recent than that of the SA 
diasporas, peaking in 2004 when former Soviet Bloc countries, most notably Poland, Lithuania and 
Latvia joined the EU and the UK opened its labour market to A8 migrants (Drinkwater, 2010:74). Prior 
to this, the EE diaspora consisted of pre-WW2 political migrants fleeing persecution, and post-WW2 
political, economic and labour migrants who were fleeing the Communist regime for survival or better 
economic prospects (Kusek and Kaplan, 2014:5). As such, the contemporary EE diasporas in the UK 
tend to be disjointed communities made up of migrants who have been settled in the UK for several 
decades, having arrived with the socio-economic disadvantage of political and economic baggage, and 
the more recent migrants, who have relocated to the UK for professional development and have little 
memory of their Communist heritage (Kusek and Kaplan, 2014:9).  
This most recent EE migratory pattern has been described as the largest-ever wave of migration to the 
UK, (Drinkwater, 2010:73) with an increase of 631,000 Poles residing in the UK between 2004 and 
2012 (Office of National Statistics). However, despite the significant proportion of professional EEs 
entering the country (approximately 10% of A8 migrant workers (Drinkwater, 2010:85)), members of 
EE diasporas tend to be categorized as labourers and depicted as “anything from a hard-working, well 
trained, ethical migrant[s] to one who abuses public assistance, takes employment from English 
people, and even commits crimes” (Kusek and Kaplan, 2014:72). This positions EE diasporas very 
differently than the diasporas previously discussed, as they are predominantly known for their 
position in the labour market rather than for their cultural differences and status as foreign, 
‘unheimlich’ entities.  
Their status as labourers is crucial in understanding the role of the EE diasporas in the EU referendum. 
One of the central questions which the referendum presented was whether the British public wanted 
to leave the EU’s sphere of free movement and trade. Voting Leave signified a desire to reduce the 
migration of European citizens to the UK and potentially complicate the resident status of the migrants 
already living in the country. As the largest group of European migrants, Polish and other EE labourers 
thus became the indirect targets of the consequences of voting Leave – targets which were only 
engorged by the widespread idea that these migrants were an “economic threat to the domestic 
working class” (Virdee, 2017:5) due to the cheap, and subsequently preferable, labour which they 
provide to British employers.  
It thus seems logical that the Leave campaign would have fed into and propagated this idea, 
positioning the increasing numbers of EE labourers, and their negative effect on the job prospects of 
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British workers, as reasons to leave the EU and restrict incoming migration. However, while this 
negative discourse surrounding the EE labourer was certainly evident in the general narrative 
surrounding the campaign (as evidenced by the anti-Polish backlash and assault on Poles which 
occurred directly after the referendum results (Komaromi, 2016)) there are very few instances of such 
a direct, negative construction of this diaspora in the campaign material.  
4.2) The Construction of the Criminal Non-Labourer  
Although the migrants targeted in VL’s anti-immigrant discourse tended to be non-European, Muslim 
others, European migrants were also negatively constructed. The VL leaflet, for example, claims that 
“a quarter of a million EU migrants come here every year – a city the size of Newcastle. This puts a big 
strain on public services like the NHS and schools” (image 21). Although the migrants are not 
specifically labelled EE, the suggestion here is that the recent, overwhelming influx of migrants (of 
which the majority originate from Poland and other EE countries) are a negative drain on the public 
resources which British tax payers’ money are funding. The specific reference to the NHS, the pride 
and symbol of the British government’s welfare system, implies the EE migrant is the cause of the 
recent NHS failings and its decrease in adequate facilities. The suggestion here is that the EE migrant 
therefore not only negatively impacts the British government’s neo-liberal welfare state and public 
facilities, but also the health, education and prospects of the British public.   
Image 21:  
 
It is no coincidence that Newcastle was selected as a point of reference. As the largest city in the North 
East, Newcastle’s reputation as a major British hub often disproportionately exceeds its status as a 
small-mid size town with a much smaller population than is often expected. Choosing a city located in 
the poorest region of the UK, which is well known for its strong working-class roots and distinct lack 
of ethnic diversity subtly connects EE immigration with poverty and low-skilled jobs, while 
simultaneously presenting the EE diaspora as a direct threat to the white, British working-class way-
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of-life. This is an echo of the previously analysed video, ‘Win £50 million with Kevin and Gary!’, 
(31/05/2016) which also reveals similar sentiments.  
The British working-class are particularly vulnerable to these implied threats, having already suffered 
downward mobility and political and social defeats since the 1980s. Delegitimised socialist policies, 
Thatcherism, the decline of Old Labour and the subsequent rise of New Labour and the austerity 
programmes introduced after 2008 (Virdee, 2017:9), all left the working class injured and resentful. 
This portrayal of the EU migrant as a direct threat to the privileges enjoyed by the working-class 
therefore frames the EE diasporas as scapegoats through which economic and social frustrations can 
be vented. The EE migrant thus becomes the target of the working class’ “resentful English 
nationalism” (Virdee, 2017:9). While only around a quarter of Leave voters identified as being of the 
lowest two social classes (Ashcroft Polls 2016), this rhetoric regarding the EE diasporas as the working 
class’ ‘enemy within’ nevertheless resonated with a category of working-class white Brits who felt as 
if an injustice had been served to them through recent neo-liberal, multicultural policies.   
However, while the VL leaflet certainly implicates EE migrants as the main threat, it does not explicitly 
construct the Polish, Hungarian, Lithuanian or Latvian diasporas negatively. Similarly, although the 
accompanying assumption is that EU migrants are not only negatively impacting public services, but 
also the labour market, the campaign resists from engaging with this discourse and refuses to present 
members of these diasporas as predominantly labour migrants. Instead, the leaflet, and other 
campaign materials, focus on constructing the EU migrant as a criminal figure. The leaflet, on two 
separate pages, states “The EU court means we can’t stop violent convicted criminals coming here 
from Europe. The EU court also stops us from deporting dangerous terror suspects” (image 21) and 
“EU judges are using the Charter of Fundamental Rights to take away more power from our police and 
security services” (image 22). The repeated references to EU criminality and British law and order 
positions the EE diasporas as potential criminals who are disrupting the safety and security of British 
society.   
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Image 22: 
 
 
This sentiment is continued in an image shared on the VL Facebook page of Theresa Rafacz, a Polish 
national, who “killed her husband by kicking and stamping on his head” (image 23). The image claims 
that EU law prevents this apparently dangerous woman from being removed from the UK, implying 
that EU membership increases the number of criminals endangering British society. This photo is the 
only direct representation of a member of the Polish diaspora in all the campaign materials analysed, 
and it is accompanied with the red, incriminating label of “EU MOST WANTED” stamped over Rafacz’s 
face. The message here is clear – EEs are a danger to British society and they are the nationality which 
Leave voters ‘most want’ to get rid of. As such, the entirety of the Polish diaspora becomes connected 
to this one dangerous, deadly and murderous individual and tarnished with the brush of criminality 
and undesirability. 
Image 23: 
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4.3) Combatting Leave’s anti-EU-migration concept?  
While VL only vaguely and briefly constructs the EE diasporas as resource-draining, potential criminals, 
the Remain campaign works to combat this general anti-migrant narrative. One of the images on the 
OB Facebook page emphasizes that Daniel Hannan, a key Leave Campaigner, admitted that “it would 
be sensible for us to have an element of free movement of labour” (image 24). Another image 
advertises the EU Renegotiation headed by David Cameron which gives the UK the power to limit 
migrant access to benefits, to encourage migrants to enter the work force and not drain government 
welfare resources. However, these images are the only examples of campaign material which make 
any attempt at combatting such negative EU migrant rhetoric. The campaign otherwise lack any 
construction or representation of EU migrants and/or members of the EE diasporas and does not make 
any attempt to portray the diaspora as beneficial to British society and the labour market.  
Image 24: 
 
This remarkable absence of members of the EE diasporas in the Remain campaign material can be 
attributed to the Remain campaigners’ unwillingness to engage in the European xenophobia and 
colonial nostalgia propagated by VL. By circumventing the construction of European, non-British 
individuals, the Remain campaign avoided having to combat the difficult and delicate topic of 
increased nationalist racism. However, it can also be explained through the lack of EE voters; unlike 
members of the SA diasporas who are predominantly British citizens with voting rights, the Polish and 
other EEs had no voting power in the election. The Remain campaign, therefore, did not seek to appeal 
to EE voters and, as such, did not need to construct positive EE representation within the campaigns.  
The political engagement of these EE diasporic communities was also limited. Their lack of voting 
rights resulted in no socio-cultural movements, nor any prominent individuals, who were politically 
promoting either of the campaigns or attempting to mobilise members of the EE diasporas to vote. 
Unfortunately, data on the extent to which second or third generation EE migrants participated in the 
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elections and campaigns is thus far non-existent, as their white-European ethnicity means that they 
are subsumed under the category of white Brits in post-election polls and other forms of data 
collection. As such, the political engagement of the EE diasporas is difficult to determine, and it is 
consequently almost impossible to estimate to what extent VL’s negative construction of EEs impacted 
the EE diasporas’ votes. 
4.4) Concluding remarks  
Despite the overwhelmingly strong anti-migrant narrative of the Leave campaign which has been 
recurrently demonstrated throughout this thesis, and the anti-Polish backlash and high numbers of 
recorded assaults on Poles following the referendum (Komaromi, 2016), VL campaign material] had 
surprisingly few constructions of the EE diasporas, while the Remain campaign had no direct 
constructions. This is particularly astounding when one considers the fact that it is exactly this 
subgroup of migrants who were directly affected by the outcome of the referendum, and whose influx 
and stay in the UK could have been impacted by voting to Leave. This suggests that it was not in fact 
the number of incoming EU migrants which worried the Leave voters and was utilised in the campaign 
materials to incentivise and impact these voters’ decision. But rather, it was the type of migrant which 
was presented as the problem. The overtly foreign, brown-skinned migrant with different religious 
views and cultural norms was presented as a much larger threat in the Leave campaign than the EU 
migrants with their white skin, Christian cultural heritage and similar social conventions. The occasions 
in which the EE migrant was presented in the VL campaigns, their negative connotations of poverty 
and crime were oftentimes overshadowed by following statements relating to terrorism. As such, the 
EE diaspora remains extremely underrepresented and marginalised by the more extreme 
constructions of other diasporic groups who are more inherently connected to the recent terrorist 
threats.   
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5) Conclusion 
5.1) Diasporic Construction 
Generally speaking, the materials analysed demonstrated that the various diasporic groups were 
rather homogenously constructed by VL and OB, yet the extent to which these diasporas were actively 
constructed differs dramatically. The constructions of the SA and EE diasporas are minimal to non-
existent in both campaigns, with EEs presented as economic and criminal threats, who directly impact 
the lives of the working class, in the Leave campaign, but not featured at all in Remain. VL also tends 
to stray away from constructing any SA figure (SA Muslim included), instead propagating the image of 
a predominantly white British society. However, SAs feature slightly more in Remain and are 
represented as fully integrated British citizens. OB’s positive, albeit somewhat marginalized, 
constructions of wholly-accepted, well-integrated migrants of Muslim and SA heritage, suggest the 
normalization and acceptance of diasporic individuals in the UK and acts as a refusal to engage with 
the racial elements of the Brexit debate. This focus on the multicultural neo-liberalism of British 
society appeared to appeal to younger voters, with 62% of voters aged 25-34 voting Remain (Lord 
Ashcroft Polls, Virdee, 2017:2).  
However, as proven by the referendum outcome, the support for this notion of multiculturality was 
not quite as widespread as the support for VL, suggesting that the jingoistic and harmful constructions 
of diasporic communities within the Leave campaign resonated among slightly more British individuals 
than the tolerant and multi-cultural message advocated by Remain. This appeal of Leave’s racist 
undertones is best evidenced through their extremely negative construction of the Middle-Eastern 
Muslim as a figure equated with danger and terrorism. Rather than focusing on demonstrating the 
benefits that Brexit would bring for reducing migration of EU citizens to the UK, VL instead 
demonstrated the threat of remaining in the EU’s freedom of movement zone, insofar as the Middle-
Eastern Muslim terrorist has much easier access to the UK through the current EU diktat. As such, the 
VL campaign became much more preoccupied in constructing negative representations of the 
dangerous Muslim figure, than with constructing the EE diasporas – the diasporas which would have 
been most strongly impacted by the decision to leave the EU.  
This narrative of the dangerous Middle-Eastern Muslim gained traction as it “dovetailed so neatly with 
long-standing repertoires of negatively evaluated representations accompanying the on-going 
racialization of the figure of the Muslim” in the Western, neo-liberal world (Virdee, 2017:6). The recent 
terrorist attacks in France and Belgium carried out by individuals of Middle-Eastern Muslim heritage, 
as well as the ongoing Syrian refugee crisis, only served to legitimize this reactionary, populist, anti-
Muslim sentiment, finding a political outlet where it could manifest itself in the form of the VL 
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campaign. By bringing the notions of Islamic terrorism into the VL campaign, the EU referendum thus 
became an opportunity for Brits to act on any subconscious and/or conscious racial biases and fears 
they had concerning UK Muslims.  
However, somewhat surprisingly and paradoxically, VL’s construction of the SA Muslim was not as 
overtly negative – in part because they rarely featured in the campaign. By refusing to construct the 
SA Muslim, and any other SAs who could potentially be misconstrued as Muslim, VL reduced the risk 
of isolating potential SA Muslim voters through their association and conflation with the negatively 
constructed Middle-Eastern Muslims. The lack of SA representation in the VL campaign also served to 
emphasize the idealistic and utopian-esque image of a racially, religious and culturally homogenous 
white Britain which the Leave camp so strongly propagated. Virdee supports this finding, claiming that 
VL detached themselves from the UK’s immigration history, instead signaling that “the Brexit project 
was precisely about keeping the nation Christian and white” (2017:6).  
VL’s herald for a white Britain with its own sovereignty and political independence from the EU fed 
into the preexisting nostalgia for the UK’s former colonial period, in which other states were reliant 
on British political, economic and cultural power – encouraging imperial longing for a return to a white 
Britain, and its accompanying notions of British superiority and white supremacy. This narrative of 
imperial nostalgia proved particularly palatable for older voters, as evidenced by the voter exit poll 
which shows that 60% of citizens aged over 65 voted Leave (Lord Ashcroft Polls, Virdee, 2017:2). It 
thus becomes clear that in the minds of many voters, particularly those of the older generation, the 
recent influx of migrants and creation of diasporic communities in the past 70 years is interconnected 
with, and potentially the cause of, 1) the decline of Imperial Britain as a hegemon in the capitalist 
global economy, 2) the UK’s loss of international prestige, 3) Britain’s worsening economy and 4) the 
increased terrorist threat and danger. 
As such, the construction of the Middle-Eastern Muslim threat in the Leave campaign was not only 
used to birth racism towards the diasporas, but acted as a socio-political accelerant, tapping into the 
long-standing racism which entered the consciousness of sectors of British society (namely the older 
generation) decades ago. VL thus framed the referendum as a movement representing much more 
than a political decision of whether to stay or remain in the EU; voting Leave became a symbolic act 
of patriotism whereby it represented a desire to simultaneously regain British sovereignty and 
international power and protect notions of Britishness from external and dangerous foreign threats. 
It became the political means through which one could express their belief in white cultural superiority 
and their view that foreign cultural and religious influences, particularly Islamic, had no place in British 
culture founded on white, Christian-based ethics and values. Although VL was not a direct source of 
anti-migrant hate, it acted as a trigger for some of the British public to carry out political anti-migrant 
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action, “envisag[ing it] as a sign that a set of assumed…cultural ‘norms’ could be reasserted” (Burnett, 
2017:88). The VL campaign material analysed in this thesis, thus built upon the already-existent racist 
consciousness among some sectors of the British public and accelerated these sentiments into political 
action, with the goal of achieving a homogenously white, internationally powerful Britain. 
5.2) Diasporic Engagement 
The construction of these diasporic groups goes someway in explaining the extent of their political 
engagement in the referendum – both in terms of their involvement in the campaigns themselves, 
and their voting habits. Unsurprisingly, the more positively a certain diaspora was constructed, the 
more likely they were to vote for that camp. As such, more Muslims and SAs voted Remain than Leave, 
due to VL’s lack of ethnic representation and predominantly negative diasporic construction. The 
turnout for voters of SA and Muslim heritage was however much lower than that of white ethnic Brits 
(Lord Ashcroft Polls, 2015). This can be explained, to some extent, by the lack of diasporic construction 
within the campaign materials themselves, as some diasporic individuals may not have been able to 
identify with a political campaign whose main target was white Brits and whose political underbelly 
was rife with post-colonial sentiments and racist undertones.  
However, other factors beyond the campaign constructions could have also influenced diasporic 
engagement and voting habits. For EE diasporas, remaining in the EU would have presented the most 
beneficial outcome, particularly for those with strong connections with their home countries, as family 
and friends could freely travel back and forth and easily migrate. Yet, as only second or third 
generation EE migrants could have voted, EE diasporic political engagement remained extremely low, 
regardless of voting incentives. Motivations for SA and Muslim engagement were not hugely 
dissimilar. On the one hand, remaining in the EU could have financially benefitted small SA business 
owners and could also ensure advantages such as free travel and trade for SA and Muslim diasporic 
individuals with families throughout the EU. On the other hand, leaving the EU could have meant 
improved ties, migration laws and trade with Commonwealth states – including the home countries 
of many of the UK’s diasporas.  
As such, the personal incentives for voting Leave or Remain, or for not voting at all, are just as richly 
diverse as those of white ethnic Brits. Diasporic engagement in national and international politics 
cannot therefore be simply pigeonholed as a direct reflection of how diasporas are politically 
constructed in political campaigns. Nevertheless, the two are irrefutably linked. As Burnett wisely 
claims, “if a hostile environment is embedded politically, why should we be surprised when it takes 
root culturally? (2017:86). In other words, it is of no coincidence that the strong anti-migrant, 
Islamophobic and jingoistic sentiments attached to the Leave campaign, manifested themselves in 
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both the voting habits and cultural attitudes of white ethnic Brits, as well as in the political involvement 
and votes of the UK’s diasporic individuals. Only time will tell whether this recent and politicized 
populist upsurge against multicultural diversity, as amplified by the VL campaign, will continue to 
manifest in the form of colonial nostalgia and legitimized racism, and whether this will subsequently 
impact the political engagement and socio-cultural involvement of Britain’s diasporic communities in 
future national political decisions. 
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